Assessing the Potential of Punitive Measures in Deterring Economic Coercion: Advocating for the Efficacy of Anti-Coercion Instrument
Purpose: Given a series of economic coercion employed by countries, such as Russia and China, the importance of tackling economic coercion has been voiced. Because of malfunction of WTO, the regulation had been left behind until the enactment of Anti Coercion Instrument (ACI) by the EU. Whereas most researches on economic coercion propose to deter economic coercion by refusal, which does not specify any threats and retaliatory measures, ACI is designed to deter it by punishment with retaliatory measures. The legislation of ACI is thus remarkable in tackling deterrence of economic coercion in a manner in which no state has ever achieved. In order to argue the effectiveness and feasibility of deterrence, this paper applies a theorical framework of nuclear deterrence proposed by Morgan (2003) to deterrence of economic coercion, mainly forcusing on credibility and unacceptable damage. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to argue the effectiveness and feasibility of economic coercion by punishment that no state has ever achieved. Design/Methodology/Approach: This paper is mostly based on open source, such as spokes person’s remarks of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and import/export data of Customs. Findings: It is hard for the EU to gurantee the credibility towards China when it employs retaliatory measures against China’s economic coercion. As to unacceptable damage that is a necessary condition of deterrence, the EU will have to demonstrate its political resolve more than the United States did. Practical impliations: Based on cases studies of China’s economic coercion, although China is known to protest its core interests, it is unveiled that China could be more sensitive to cost than it had been anticipated. Orginality: This paper argues the effectiveness and feasibility of Anti Coercion Insturment, which just came in force in the end of December 2023. This paper thus has the forsseablity of deterring economic coercion by punishment.