The Diversification-Performance relationship in Spanish Firms: Does The CEO/S Behaviour Style matter?

Almudena Martinez-Campillo, Roberto Fernandez-Gago
European Research Studies Journal, Volume XI, Issue 1-2, 57-70, 2008
EOI: 10.11214/thalassinos.11.01.005

Abstract:

The agency-stewardship theoretical framework posits that CEOs may choose to act as agents or as stewards. CEOs as agents are economically rational individuals driven by self-interest, whereas CEOs as stewards are self-actualizing individuals that behave pro-organizationally. Our study extends this framework to analyze whether the CEO/s behavior style affects the diversification-performance relationship. After applying Heckman/s method on a sample of Spanish firms, our results verify that diversification affects positively on firm performance and such effect is significantly strong when this strategy is managed and implemented by a CEO inclined to behave as steward.


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